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Foreward to the Corporate Social
Responsibility Symposium:
Reflections on Directions
By William L. Cary*
Harvey J. Goldschmid**
General Observations
Historically, the states have played the central role in shaping the
law as to the governance of business corporations. During the first
years of the nineteenth century, states granted special franchises to cor-
porations that limited their size, duration, and management preroga-
tives. Later, under the aegis of terms like "liberal," "modern," and
"enabling," Delaware led a movement among the states that resulted in
law that was, by a near-consensus view, highly permissive.'
The regulation of corporations was not, of course, left entirely to
the states. In selected areas of national concern, the federal govern-
ment imposed effective external controls on corporations. The Sher-
man Act, in 1890, began the federalization of antitrust, and waves of
Congressional enactments, particularly in the 1930s and 1960s, im-
posed federal strictures in a wide array of fields.
Within the past five years, however, reformers have increasingly
questioned the efficacy of our "enabling-regulatory" mix. As the rich
citations infra of Professor Epstein and Mr. Small demonstrate, ques-
tions about the power, efficiency, social responsibility, and accountabil-
ity of large modern corporations have been raised with accelerating
frequency and intensity.
* Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A., 1931, LL.B., 1934 Yale;
M.B.A. 1938, Harvard University; LL.D., 1965, Amherst College.
** Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A., 1962, J.D., 1965, Columbia
University.
1. For our views on this permissiveness, see, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law-
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663 (1974); Goldschmid, The Greening ofthe Board
Room: Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 17 (1973).
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The questions posed in this symposium are timely indeed. As this
issue goes to press, these questions are the subject of study (or proposed
study) by, for example, the Congress, the American Law Institute, the
American Bar Association, the SEC, and the FTC. Moreover, the
states and many corporations have shown a willingness to consider
thoughtful criticism. Recent state cases dealing with fiduciary stand-
ards have, for example, noticeably tightened the law2; there is consider-
able voluntary experimentation by corporations in the governance
area.
The editors of The Hastings Law Journal have wisely added three
unusual features to this symposium. First, they have made it an inter-
disciplinary endeavor; several of the principal writers (e.g., Professors
Epstein and Jones and Dr. Hessen) draw their inspirations from
sources outside the law. Second, the format of lead articles followed by
short essays of comment helps both to sharpen issues and to provide
balance. Finally, there is a lively mixture of American pragmatism and
European conceptualism represented in the lead articles.
In Europe, for example, "corporate personality" is widely dis-
cussed, but here, whether or not to disregard the corporate form or
"pierce the corporate veil" is approached in pragmatic rather than the-
oretical terms. Judicial decisions turn on facts and context: Have cor-
porate funds and functions been intermingled? Has the corporation
been too thinly capitalized? Are we dealing in contract (where trade
creditors may protect themselves) or tort? In the end, the basic inquiry
turns on whether "piercing the corporate veil" would prevent fraud or,
taking account of countervailing considerations such as the encourage-
ment of capital formation and the enhancement of certainty, be equita-
ble and fair.
Similarly, American law does not take seriously long, theoretical
discussions of the concession theory and whether the corporation is a
creature of the state. We ignore history in this regard and assume the
corporation is here to stay. When considering new corporate regula-
tion, we ask whether governmental intervention will be socially benefi-
cial in the long run. If on balance new legislation is thought desirable,
Congressional powers under the Commerce Clause or similar constitu-
tional provisions or state "police power" interpretations-not conces-
sion rationales-provide the basis for the enactment. In the words of
2. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. Interna-
tional Industries, Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Jones t,. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. I Cal. 3d
93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (en banc).
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Professor Willard F. Mueller, "[m]ost Americans seem to have forgot-
ton that business corporations are created and survive only as a special
privilege of the state";3 we concur in this interpretation.
Thus, because Americans tend to conceptualize the problems of
the corporation and corporate laws less than our European friends, it is
refreshing to have a volume that comprehensively reviews European
developments. In terms of pragmatic American reform approaches,
this volume demonstrates that there is both much common ground and
some real diversity. Set forth below are what we consider to be basic
tenets of most current American corporate reform thinking:
1. Most reform proposals remain free-market oriented. While
most proposals would require new legislation, they do not take owner-
ship or control of our major corporations out of private hands. In con-
trast to much European debate, corporate reformers here do not
generally propose more government ownership, broad national plan-
ning or other fundamental change. Socialism does not have a large
following in the United States. While proposals such as the
Humphrey-Javits Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act sur-
face periodically, most Americans appear to agree with France's Presi-
dent Giscard d'Estaing who reportedly described his country's
relatively unhappy experience with planning as the simple "sub-
stit[ution of] error for chance."'4
2. Most reformers purport to be acting in the interest of keeping
the corporation an effective economic entity. For example, although
consumer advocates and environmentalists often speak about "taking
additional considerations into account" beyond corporate profitability,
Professor Schwartz infra and other leading reformers accept the goal of
long-term profit maximization (within the law) as an adequate descrip-
tion of corporate objectives. The main point, we think, that Professors
Epstein and Schwartz are making herein is that what is socially desira-
ble is not necessarily inconsistent-indeed, may be quite consis-
tent-with long-term corporate profitability. They are each concerned
about developing an internal corporate "process" for sensitively har-
monizing societal concerns and long-term profitability.
3. Most reformers share with us a concern about creating a large,
new federal bureaucracy. A premise of the original proposal for a fed-
3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1971, at 63, col. 1.
4. H. GOLDSCHMID, BusINEss DISCLOSuRE: GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO KNOW 201
(1979). For a comprehensive discussion of planning proposals for the United States and a
review of the French experience, see id at 201-61.
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eral minimum-standards act was that the SEC would play no new role
and no new bureaucracy would be created.
4. Most proposals retain and, within the limit of what is practica-
ble, try to enhance the role of shareholders. Shareholders remain the
basic risk-takers (e.g., as holders of Penn Central discovered) in the
corporate system. Facile assertions during the 1950s and 1960s about
refinancing through self-generating funds have now been replaced by
fears of a capital shortage. On a pragmatic level, shareholders also rep-
resent the best constituency for counterbalancing management power,
and they are free of many of the personal or career conflicts (e.g., when
a hostile tender offer is made) associated with corporate managers. In
addition, many reform proposals would heighten the duties of loyalty
running to shareholders from directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders.
5. While, as Mr. Small indicates, proposals to reform the board
of directors are diverse and sometimes quite inconsistent, almost all
share a sense that there is need to strengthen the governance role of
directors and to provide an independent, ongoing check of corporate
managers.
6. Finally, many proponents of corporate law reform advocate
new federal legislation. For example, the following statement was en-
dorsed by eighty corporation law professors from sixty-two different
institutions:
[W]e are in general agreement that state corporation statutes and
case law have suffered over the years from what . . . has [been]
called a "race to the bottom," and that as a consequence they no
longer serve to guide and regulate the activity of large corporations
and their managers. . . . [T]here is a particular urgency at this time
for the Congress to consider some form of federal intervention in this
area, whether through the means of a federal chartering statute,
through federal "minimum standards" for state corporation laws, or
some other mechanism.
5
For the most part, in short, and certainly for the American writers
gathered in this Symposium, the modem corporate social responsibility
debate is not about radical solutions. Our spectrum of views is not
wide when judged by European standards.
Reflections on the Symposium and on Reform Directions
The first Article in the symposium is by Professor Thomas M.
5. Hearings on Corporate Rights and Reasponsibilities before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 343-44 (1976).
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Jones, of the School of Business Administration of the University of
Washington, and because it is the only piece without an accompanying
commentary, we will discuss it at some length. Focusing upon the 1932
Berle and Means hypothesis concerning the divorce of management
from control, Professor Jones analyzes the premise thoroughly before
agreeing with it. He cites the work of Robert Lamer in 1966 and de-
votes much of his paper to attacking Morris Zeitlin's critique of the
Berle and Means thesis in the American Journal of Sociology. Professor
Jones finds that the Zeitlin structural analysis has not shaken the Berle
and Means approach and that massive research would be necessary for
behavioral analysis to investigate more deeply.
One point is made in Professor Jones' article that cannot be over-
emphasized, namely, the difference between retaining existing control
and newly securing it. Unless there is some traumatic change in the
business or unless an outside party, typically a corporation with great
resources, attempts to make a tender offer, continuation of control in an
existing group (presumably management) is almost inevitable. Fur-
thermore, when we are talking about "control" it should be recognized
that a takeover bid, as distinguished from a proxy context, is initiated
typically by an outsider and not a long-standing shareholder. .
It is true that Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg, in The Structure of
the Corporation,6 points to substantial data showing the continued
presence of a significant degree of concentration of stockholding even
in the very largest companies. At the same time, Professor Jones con-
cludes that although wealthy individuals and institutions do still hold
large blocks of stock in major companies, this could be an attempt to
diversify their portfolios or stabilize their incomes rather than a coordi-
nated macro-control mechanism.
Professor Jones believes that the role of law in establishing the
relative power of shareholders and management has been ignored by
social scientists and that careful analysis of existing law and changes in
it probably can tell us more about corporate control than can further
studies of shares ownership. Thus, a nonlawyer in the field of business
administration throws us back into the law in determining the sources
of control.
In conclusion, Professor Jones might agree that the empirical issue
of control is still an open one, but he would reject as inadequate Zeit-
lin's remedy for closing the gap-a comprehensive structural analysis.
6. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 45-51 (1976).
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He argues that given the inherent advantage held by an incumbent
management, any ownership position of less than ten percent, held by
an insurgent group, is a relatively trivial factor in a proxy fight. He
persuasively suggests that despite the fact that shareholders have voting
power, which ultimately could be dispositive in corporate control strug-
gles, they lack both the incentive and other political resources seriously
to threaten management hegemony. Further, he believes that stock-
holders rarely overcome their lack of cohesiveness because manage-
ment has sufficient resources including time, information, legal
advantage, and the financial and organizational strength of the firm
itself to effectively neutralize potential aggregate shareholder power.
Thus, he identifies the locus of corporate power back in the manage-
ment; we find it hard to disagree.
In the second Article, Professor Edwin M. Epstein, of Berkeley's
School of Business Administration, properly recognizes that debates
about corporate responsibility and governance are primarily focused on
the "megacorporation." Although there are approximately 2,000,000
corporations in the United States, something more than sixty percent of
the nation's manufacturing wealth is owned by the largest 200; in 1977,
the 500 largest industrial corporations listed by Fortune magazine em-
ployed approximately 15,000,000 people." Professor Epstein seems to
believe that corporate critics are talking about roughly 1,000-4,000 cor-
porations. This may be a bit too restrictive. For many issues (e.g., new
fiduciary standards), it may be helpful to think in terms of the 10,000-
15,000 corporations covered by the American Law Institute's proposed
Federal Securities Code.
Professor Epstein wisely draws an analytical distinction between
"internal" questions (e.g., corporate governance and legitimacy issues)
and "external" questions (i e., the corporation's obligation to other sec-
tors of society). He observes that corporate social responsibilty issues
are often value-laden and dynamic. He makes a substantial contribu-
tion by, in effect, urging corporate reformers to focus on developing a
"process" whereby "management anticipates and takes account of, to
the fullest extent possible, the total ramifications-economic and
noneconomic-of its decisions."
In urging attention to "total ramifications," Professor Epstein is
not rejecting the traditional corporate goal of long-term profitability.
7. Hearings on The Merger Act of 1979 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (unpublished statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr., Director of the
Bureau of Competition, FTC).
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He is simply recognizing, as we read him, that the large modem corpo-
ration must respond effectively to societal demands if it is to retain its
capacity to produce goods and services efficiently. Epstein does not
ascribe to what Professor Conard, his commentator, terms the "reallo-
cation" theory of corporate resonsibility. Conard indicates that a "real-
location" theory would require "radical change in the composition of
governing boards"; investor representatives, employees, consumers,
and environmentalists would "presumably trade off their respective in-
terests, perhaps in the same way that senators from Maine and Arizona
trade off reclamation expenditures for harbor improvements."
We question whether there is much to be gained by bringing the
real tensions that should exist, for example, between management and
labor, into the board room. Do we really want either side to bargain
less hard? Even if a practical way were found to provide consumers,
environmentalists, and others with board representation, what costs
would be involved in having corporations-without legislative gui-
dance-reconcile tensions among competing economic, social, and po-
litical goals? Long-term profit maximization is, of course, a malleable
concept. Do we want to move away from it and give corporate deci-
sionmakers even wider discretion?
We should hesitate to ask corporations-economic institutions that
by and large serve us well-to carry too much baggage. What is so
persuasive about Professor Epstein's "process" point is that it accepts
the profitability concept and only urges that it be applied with subtlety,
a long-term perspective,* and care.
Marshall Small's piece is a lawyer's delight. While it may be easy
to quibble with one conclusion or another, in general we agree with
commentator Schwartz as to the high order of Small's "wisdom, practi-
cal advice, and first-rate scholarship."
Small provides a comprehensive review of the "evolving role of
the director in corporate governance." He effectively covers the trends
toward nonmanagement directors, the increased use of board commit-
tees, and significant due diligence requirements for individual direc-
tors. As to the long-term profit-maximization standard, he concludes
that in the "usual case the long-term interests of the enterprise will be
consistent with the interests of. . .other constituencies." In cases of
real conflict, Small finds that the long-term interests of the owners must
prevail.
Small has a deep and perceptive discussion of what responsibilities
directors can reasonably be expected to assume. Until recently (when
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"under the direction of" was inserted into many corporation laws),
most state corporation laws absolutely and majestically commanded
that "the business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of
directors." But, as numerous scholars have documented, there was a
considerable gap between myth and reality as to the role played by the
board. The law's expectations, taken literally, were too high; the per-
formances of many directors, especially prior to the securities law ex-
plosion of the late 1960s and early 1970s, were abysmally low. Mr.
Small's outline of a modem director's duties provides sensible balance.
A careful reading of his discussion will be richly rewarded.
Dr. Hessen's article on the concession theory (and his advocacy of
a "private property model") has a quaint eighteenth century ring. Dr.
Hessen seems to ask: What is wrong with providing corporate manag-
ers with absolute freedom from legal restrictions? The essence of capi-
talism, he argues, is the "inviolability of individual rights, including the
right to use or invest wealth as one chooses and the right to associate
with others for any purpose and under any mutually acceptable terms
of association." As to problems created by management power, Dr.
Hessen responds: "Ownership without control is not an evil if the own-
ers freely consent to that relationship."
Not even Adam Smith would be as bold as Dr. Hessen. Smith, for
example, would have punished antitrust violations such as conspiracies
to raise price. In modern terms, is it really debatable whether the right
to associate for "any purpose" may properly be restricted by antritrust
and other trade regulation rules, criminal laws, health and safety con-
cerns, or whatever other measures legislatures enact for sound public
purposes?
As to the argument that providing corporate managers with free-
dom from legal restrictions is acceptable because shareholders are con-
senting adults, we simply question Dr. Hessen's assumption.
Shareholders of our largest corporations do not negotiate arm's-length
"bargains" with management. If the law does not intervene to establish
basic fiduciary and governance "rules of the game," managers will in-
evitably attain unbridled power. Indeed, this has been a fundamental
problem under state "enabling" statutes. We believe unchecked man-
agement power could, for example, have the following negative
consequences.
First, it encourages capricious corporate decisionmaking. A "horri-
ble" example of the negative impact of managerial caprice is found in
SEC and Congressional reports on the collapse of the Penn Central.
[Vol. 30
Caprice was evident in decisions about, for example, whether to merge,
how to merge, the calculation of "merger savings," and the negotiation
of labor contracts. Penn Central's board was alleged to have received
almost no realistic financial information; it ignored indications of im-
pending disaster.
8
In response to more moderate calls than Dr. Hessen's for un-
restricted management authority, Dean Courtney Brown, who has
spent over two decades serving on some of the nation's most important
boards, persuasively answered:
[A] single major blunder of judgment can damage an enterprise seri-
ously. It would be interesting to know the extent to which write-offs,
ranging from $100 million to $500 million, that have been recorded
in recent years by such well-known companies as Anaconda, Ford,
General Dynamics, Occidental Petroleum, RCA, and United Air-
craft stemmed from the dominant influence of one decision maker.
Or, in a different type of situation, a head man's prolonged lack of
imaginative leadership or judgment can result in a gradual erosion of
the organization's vitality over a number of years.
The strength of our form of political democracy is in its system
of checks and balances .... As the modem corporation confronts
the progressively more complex problems of what has been called the
post-industrial era, it will stand in progressively greater need of the
advantages of a system of checks and balances within its own
operations.9
Second, managers may misallocate corporate resources because they
have somewhat different interests than the shareholders they theoretically
serve. Dr. Hessen accepts the corporate goal of long-term profit max-
imization. But economists such as John Galbraith argue that "growth,"
rather than profit maximization, is often management's goal. Without
the law setting standards would managers subordinate their goals to
those of remote and unknown shareholders? Similarly, might not se-
nior managers, aware their performances will be measured over a rela-
tively few years, be tempted to subordinate long-term corporate
advantages for short-term profits?
Third, managers may succumb to inherent conflicts-of-interest.
Consider, for example, (i) compensation questions, (ii) management's
position when either hostile (e.g., with careers at stake) or friendly (e.g.,
with various "carrots" being offered) tender offers are made, and (iii)
8. See, e.g., SEC, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY;
HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STAFF REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 1264, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); J. DAUGHEN & P. BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL
(1971).
9. C. BROWN, PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK 16, 19 (1976).
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the various "going private" scenarios, and the need for some restraint
on managers becomes abundantly clear.
In sum, if put into effect, we believe Dr. Hessen's "private property
model" would grievously injure modern capital formation. We dis-
cussed our approach to the concession theory earlier. In general, un-
fortunately, we concur with Professor Hamilton's critical review of the
Hessen piece.
Professor Gunter H. Roth with the help of Professor Hanns Fitz
has provided us with a very thoughtful analysis of the European model
with respect to corporate social responsibility. There are movements in
Europe of which we should be more keenly aware; some are possible
straws in our own wind. For example, Professor Roth points to the
development of social accounting in a few German companies, and in-
deed, has provided us with a remarkable example of a social account-
ing sheet from the 1977 statement of the German Shell Corporation.
Although it has weaknesses that he has identified, it nevertheless is a
constructive and concrete way of fostering some self-consciousness on
the part of corporate managers with respect to their responsibilities not
only to shareholders and employees but also to the community. Roth
recognizes there are difficulties in trying to make "social advance-
ments" clear in terms of numbers; for example, there are problems of
allocation and measurement. On the other hand, everything does not
have to be quantified and the disclosure process provides a stimulus to
management's self-analysis of a company's role in the public realm.
Professors Roth and Fitz also discuss the development, particu-
larly in Germany, of co-determination and conclude interestingly
enough that employee democracy does not seem to be much better than
shareholder democracy for which they have little respect. It appears
that the employee representatives are actually representatives of the
trade unions rather than of the company itself, and that trade union
membership in Germany includes less than fifty percent of the labor
force. In consequence, even if the voice of employees were heard it
would not be that of a majority.
Professors Roth and Fitz have not, nor has anyone to our knowl-
edge, provided us information as to the impact of participation by
workers on the Supervisory Board upon the social and community
problems of the corporation.
Professor Christopher Stone, of the University of Southern Cali-
fornia, has expressed doubt whether more direct representation by
shareholders would lead to as much recognition of corporate social re-
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sponsibility as is now assumed by management;' 0 the shareholders' sole
interest might be dividends and market value. In the same vein, a
worthwhile study could be undertaken to determine whether labor in
Germany has shown itself exclusively interested in wages and terms of
employment. Does labor ignore the broader social outlook that many
managements have embraced?
As to the growth of a co-determination movement in this country,
most of us would agree with the comment of Professor Vagts (who the
editors wisely asked to write a special foreword on European law) that
labor seems to have no interest in it. It was raised once by the United
Auto Workers in negotiation with Chrysler but subsided. It seems con-
trary to the adversary philosophy and collective-bargaining traditions
of American labor.
Professor Clive M. Schmitthoff suggests that co-determination by
employees in Germany has undoubtedly contributed to the fairly
peaceful labor relations existing in that country and points to the devel-
opment of works councils and to the Dutch Company Law Reform,
which has adopted the principle of co-optation. Under the Dutch
mode of selection, if there is a vacancy on the supervisory board, the
board itself selects a candidate with the shareholders and employees
having a right to veto.
A basic reform recommendation of Professor Roth is premised on
his general reaction that "shareholder democracy" has little vitality and
that employee democracy does not seem much better. His suggestion is
that "a much better approach would be to make management the
trustee of all interests involved. Such a system would entail a conflict-
of-interest-free supervisory body established on a super-management
level." He points out that writers in this country have emphasized the
ineffectiveness of shareholder voting rights. He believes that if share-
holder voting did not exist there would be a reasonable and realistic
foundation for a more socially responsible managment. The theory is
that the greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduci-
ary, the greater the scope of his duty. Only with the abolition of the
theory founded upon the "ultimate control" of the shareholders will
management's fiduciary duties be expanded to include a concern for
the general social interest.
This idyllic, self-perpetuating board has initial appeal. On the
other hand, do not American shareholders play a most helpful role in
10. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 233 (1975).,
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restraining or goading management? The very fact that control of the
corporation may shift by the purchase of the shares in a tender offer has
undoubtedly tended to keep management alert as opposed to self-satis-
fied or lethargic. Also, there is no better constituency than shareholders
for preventing corporate officers and directors from becoming benefi-
ciaries of their own unrestrained munificence. Even "trustees" cannot
be relied upon for impersonal and objective self-appraisal. Perhaps
Professor Roth's model might still permit the shareholders' derivative
suit, which has been such a useful device in keeping some manage-
ments in line. We agree that the role of "shareholder democracy" has
been exaggerated by some writers. Nevertheless, in our view, the vot-
ing process and proxy contests, shareholder proposals, and tender offers
represent a positive force for making management responsible and effi-
cient. Without some role for shareholders we would be concerned that
American industry might lose sight of its basic profit-maximization
function. In general, we question the applicability of the trustee model
(presumably self-perpetuating) to the American scene.
We have each set forth proposals for corporate law reform else-
where at some length. "' Fundamentally, we believe new federal legis-
lation is necessary. Such legislation, briefly sketched, should provide
for: (1) replacement of inadequate state laws in specified sensitive ar-
eas; (2) the establishment of a basic governance structure which would
provide for a corporate board capable of checking or monitoring man-
agement and an enhanced (but realistically measured) role for share-
holders; (3) the establishment of a spectrum of new remedies and
penalties (e.g., suspensions and civil money penalties for derelictions
by officers or directors); and (4) carefully constructed governance pro-
visions aimed at assuring corporate compliance with the law.
Our approach neither takes corporate control out of private hands
nor creates a new government bureaucracy. It is intended to make the
large corporation a more effective economic animal. Aside from in-
creased emphasis on obedience to the law, it in no way departs from
the goal of long-term profitability.
Our view is that any legislation in this area should be drafted with
an eye on what is fundamental. Our drafting analogy should be the
Constitution not the Internal Revenue Code.
If new legislation includes governance provisions that help assure
11. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law- Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974); Hearings on Corporate Rights and Responsibilities before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1976) (statement of Harvey J. Goldschmid).
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corporate compliance with the law, we would hope that the net effect of
such legislation would be less government regulation. In the long run,
we think, legislators would feel less compulsion to impose costly, re-
dundant, external checks on corporations because of fears about what
might be happening inside. Finally, the kind of board and shareholder
roles we envision might necessitate fewer shareholder suits. This, of
course, is particularly true in the various conflict-of-interest situations.
In conclusion, we offer our congratulations to the editors of The
Hastings Law Journal for inspiring this important volume.

